The aim of this study was to examine whether locations of objects are encoded and available to the reader at different points in a narrative depending on their causal relevance. Participants in five experiments read narratives in which the spatial relation between an object and its location either did or did not provide a causal explanation for a later critical event. Object and location target words were presented to participants immediately before or after the critical event.
In Experiment 1, objects that were part of critical spatial information were mentioned in think-aloud protocols more often after the critical sentence in the causally-relevant condition than in the control condition, suggesting that readers reinstated object information when its spatial relations were causally important to the outcome sentence. In the next two experiments we investigated whether readers encode location information during unprompted reading and whether they make inferences about spatial information when it is causally relevant to the text. In Experiment 2a, a probe word representing the spatial location of the object was presented to participants immediately after the critical or outcome sentence-the point at which an inference involving the location would provide a causal explanation for the outcome in the experimental condition. Participants were instructed to indicate as quickly and accurately as possible whether the target word had been encountered previously in the text. Response times and accuracy to the target were recorded. If readers use location information in causal explanations about a surprising event and if location information is accessible to the reader as he/she is processing the outcome, then the participants' responses to the probe word would be faster and/or more accurate in the causally-relevant version of text than in the control version. If readers do not make inferences about location or do not have access to this information then there would be no significant difference in the response time and accuracy to the probe word between the two conditions.
Method
Participants. Thirty-seven undergraduate students taking an introductory psychology class at the University of Minnesota participated in this experiment for extra credit. All participants spoke American English as their first language and had normal or corrected to normal vision.
Materials. The materials were the same as in Experiment 1. The location words were presented as targets. In addition to the 12 experimental stories, 12 filler stories similar in length and style were constructed and matched with a target word that did not occur in the text. Table 1 presents mean accuracy rates and mean response times to the probe words.
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Response times to the probe word were significantly faster in the causally relevant condition than in the control condition, 
Experiment 2b
In the previous experiment, the location probe word was more highly activated in the causal version than in the control immediately after the outcome sentence, suggesting that an inference about the spatial information had been made. These results are in accord with those from Experiment 1. It is possible, however, that these results are not caused by inference generation but by differences in the extent to which location information was activated after its initial introduction but before the target statement. Experiment 2b was designed to test this possibility:
Here, the probe word was presented immediately before the outcome sentence. If the causally relevant and control conditions in Experiment 2a differ in the maintenance or prior activation of location after it was mentioned in the text, then the response to the location probe would be faster and/or more accurate in the causally-relevant condition than the control condition. In contrast, if there is no differential activation prior to the outcome statement, then there would be no significant differences in response time and accuracy of the target word between the control and causally-relevant versions of the story.
Method
Participants. Thirty-eight undergraduate students taking an introductory psychology class at the University of Minnesota participated in this experiment for extra credit. All participants spoke American English as their first language and had normal or corrected to normal vision.
Materials. Materials were identical to those in Experiment 2a.
Design and Apparatus. The design and apparatus were identical to that in Experiment 2a.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as the one in Experiment 2a, except that the probe word was presented before the critical sentence instead of after it. Table 1 presents the mean accuracy rates and mean response times to the probe word.
Neither speed nor accuracy of responses to the probes differed significantly between conditions either by subject analysis or by item analysis [both Fs < 1]. Thus, there was no evidence that objects were re-activated or maintained prior to the outcome sentence. Accuracy rates to the comprehension questions in the causally relevant condition (M = 93%, SD = .12) did not statistically differ from those in the control condition (M = 94%, SD = .10) [both Fs < 1]. Causal condition interacted with experiment in the combined analyses of Experiments 3a and 3b, F 1 (1, 82) = 6.31, MS e = 14410, p = .014; F 2 (1, 22) = 2.66, MS e = 7542, p = .12, indicating that response times for object information were faster in the causally-relevant condition than in the control condition, but only after a causal-explanation inference was generated. Furthermore, a one-tailed t-test comparison on response times in the causally relevant condition revealed that response times to object target words presented after the outcome sentence were significantly faster than response times to targets presented immediately before the outcome sentence in an analysis by subjects, t 1 = 1.73, p = .04. The results for Experiments 3a and 3b demonstrate that an object is reinstated after-but not before-an outcome sentence only when it provides a causal explanation for the outcome. Thus, the results for objects parallel those obtained for locations. Both are encoded during reading and available for later processing. Furthermore, they are reinstated at a later point in the text when and only when they are causally relevant.
Discussion
The results from five experiments demonstrate that during reading information concerning spatial relations is reactivated when needed for causal coherence. The results of Experiments 2b and 3b suggest that these activations were indeed re-activations. They were not the result of simple maintenance in working memory: neither object nor location were activated prior to the outcome sentence. Furthermore, the fact that object and location information was reinstated implies that the association was encoded at some level during initial reading. This spatial association was accessible during reading of the remainder of the narrative although it was only re-activated when needed for coherence.
It is conceivable that activation of the targets in the experimental condition (when probed after the critical sentence) could have been obtained if there were maintenance of the spatial information before the critical sentence. In the present study the relation between object and location (i.e. ticket stub in Mark's pocket) could have remained more available (than neutral information) seeing as it might be considered an unfulfilled goal or condition with consequences. Such maintenance has been observed for unsatisfied goals, resulting in greater availability of these goals relative to completed goals (Lutz & Radvansky, 1997) . However, this possibility did not extend to the spatial information in our studies. In Experiments 3a and 3b, participants responded significantly more slowly to object targets presented before the outcome than to those presented after the outcome. This pattern of results does not support an interpretation that the objects related to an unfulfilled goal were continuously maintained in memory until the critical outcome, promoting shorter response times to the target. Furthermore, in those experiments in which participants were probed with the target before the outcome sentence (2b and 3b), response times to targets in the control and causally relevant conditions did not differ. This also suggests that the spatial information (potential unfulfilled goal) was not maintained immediately prior to the outcome, else one would have expected to observe shorter response times to the probe in the causal condition relative to the control condition.
Another possible explanation is that our results reflect decreased availability of the spatial information in the control texts rather than increased availability of the spatial information in the experimental texts 2 . With respect to goals, for instance, Lutz and Radvansky (1997) observed that failed goal information remained more available than completed goal information, and concluded that this was due to "both an increased availability of failed goal information and a decreased availability of completed goal information (relative to failed goal information)" (p.
308). Additional evidence has supported the notion that readers suppress irrelevant information during reading (e.g., Gernsbacher & Faust, 1991; Gernsbacher, Keysar, Robertson, Werner, 2001; Linderholm, Gernsbacher, van den Broek, Neninde, Robertson, Sundermeier, 2004) . Therefore, it is possible that the outcome sentence in the control condition in these experiments might have led the reader away from thinking about the target spatial information because it was no longer relevant, decreasing its availability. However, there was a negligible difference between responses to the object and location probes before versus after the outcome in the control versions of the text 3 . Therefore, suppression alone does not adequately account for the results in the current study because there was no decrease in availability of location and object information in the control text versions.
Our results and interpretations are consistent with existing models of text comprehension.
For example, the conclusion that spatial information may be encoded and may be retrievable at later points in reading without having been maintained in short-term memory is compatible with notions of long-term working memory (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995) , of implicit focus on information connected to the protagonist in a story (Garrod & Sanford, 1990) , and with resonance theories of text representation and retrieval (Myers & O'Brien, 1998; O'Brien, Raney, Albrecht, & Footnotes 1 Two additional experiments were conducted in which speed was emphasized more than accuracy in the instructions to participants. There was a significant 10% difference in accuracy rates to targets in experimental vs. control conditions when probed after the critical sentence. When probed before the critical sentence there was a non-significant 1% difference in accuracy rates between experimental and control conditions. In these experiments, there were no significant differences in response times. These results on accuracy provide convergent evidence for those obtained for response times in Experiments 2a and 2b.
2 We thank Arthur Glenberg for suggesting this possibility. 3 The difference in response times to targets presented before and after the outcome sentences in the control (non-causal) version was not significant, all t's < 1. .25
